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Poetry in the 20th century, in keeping with other forms of modern thought, 
had its own ways of undermining anthropocentric assumptions about the 
relationship between objects and human consciousness. The decentering of the 
human subject from the operations of the world is at work in contestations of lyric 
as the expressive mode of a sovereign self, or in the inscription of the poetic subject 
in a world of things. Resistance to the anthropocentric legacy of Descartes’s res 
cogitans could hardly be more robustly demonstrated in poetry than it is by the 
French poet Francis Ponge, well known for the aesthetic and philosophical 
commitments of his poetics of ordinary objects. Within a literary tradition that often 
thematizes the limits of human reason and linguistic conventions, Ponge’s work, 
which he characterized as a phenomenological dictionary (Proêmes 218) in his 
essay on Camus and the absurd, is a rich site of reflection on how language 
expresses and regulates the relationship of human beings to an environment 
populated by nonhuman things. Look no further than the first poem of his most 
famous collection, Le Parti pris des choses (‘In Favor of Things’), published in 
1942. In this poem, “Pluie” (‘Rain’), we find the pronoun “je” ‘I’ exactly once, in 
the first sentence, indicating an observer of the natural phenomenon of rain falling 
in a courtyard: “La pluie, dans la cour où je la regarde tomber, descend à des allures 
très diverses” (15) ‘Rain, in the courtyard where I watch it fall, comes down at 
varying speeds.’1 Ponge’s collection opens with the poetic subject, susceptible to 
appearances (that the properties of raindrops vary depending on the distance from 
the observer), checking in on the world outside, a trope of a supposedly once-
sovereign human interiority turned inside out in favor of the things of the nonhuman 
world. But despite its contingent and relative apprehension of natural phenomena, 
the human subject resists complete erasure from the grammatical surface and the 
deeper rhetorical structures of this poem, which ends by conjoining the natural 
event and human enjoyment within the insoluble ambivalence of a shared past 
participle: “il a plu” (16) ‘it has rained/pleased.’ For Ponge, the inalienably human 
practice of language inevitably enacts human ends, and this essay explores how his 
poetics has as its end the happiness of human beings acting in accordance with their 
nature and the nature of things. 
A poetics of the nonhuman is inevitably encumbered by the traces, or signs, 
of the human linguistic project that enacts it. As practitioners of such a poetics 
pursue the aesthetic goal of figuring the nonhuman—for instance manmade or 
 
1 All translations are my own. To avoid syntactic inaccuracies I use “man” to translate “l’homme.” 
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natural objects or substances, or nonhuman inhabitants of the natural world—the 
forms and regimes of human meaning persist as the remainder in a poetic operation 
that can only gesture beyond its margins. In “Raisons de vivre heureux” (‘Reasons 
to Live Happy’), Ponge locates the limit of a poetic project that aspires to describe 
objects “de leur propre point de vue” ‘from their own point of view,’ remarking 
famously that, “Il y a toujours du rapport à l’homme. . . . l’on ne peut aucunement 
sortir de l’homme” ‘There is always some relation to man. . . . one cannot get 
outside of man’ (Proêmes 198). When Ponge reformulates this remark in “Faune et 
flore” (‘Fauna and Flora’) as “L’on ne peut sortir de l’arbre par des moyens d’arbre” 
(Parti 43) ‘One cannot get outside of trees by tree-like means,’ we see that even 
our figures of the nonhuman leave us perpetually enclosed within our own 
practices. Ponge is, of course, hardly unique in negotiating such contradictions. 
Yves Bonnefoy’s Du mouvement et de l’immobilité de Douve (‘On the Movement 
and Immobility of Douve’), for instance, figures the demise of the lyric subject by 
inscribing the poetic text in a virtual space where representation cancels itself, “où 
se déchire le poème” (62) ‘where the poem tears itself up’ or “à une profondeur où 
les images ne prennent plus” (57) ‘at a depth where images no longer take.’ But the 
problem remains double: on the one hand, things are not captured by the language 
we set aside for them, and on the other hand, they can make us overlook the human 
language of the somewhat social relation we have with them, their “rapport à 
l’homme”—our experience and the act of representation— “wherein,” as Bill 
Brown argues, “modernity’s ontological distinction between human beings and 
nonhumans makes no sense” (451). “If commodities could speak” Marx speculated 
in Capital (176), and we sometimes forget they cannot, or as Ponge reminds us in 
Proêmes: “Ce ne sont pas les choses qui parlent entre elles mais les hommes entre 
eux qui parlent des choses” (Proêmes 198) ‘It’s not things that speak among 
themselves, but human beings that speak among themselves about things.’ How are 
we to assess, in the poetics of the nonhuman, the insurmountably human? 
Recent scholarship on Ponge has fruitfully pointed to how the incomplete 
apprehension of the material excess or otherness of the nonhuman poses not only 
an aesthetic challenge for the text but an ethical opportunity for human subjects that 
would renounce or denounce their imprint on the nonhuman world that their 
expressions figure. Vanessa Robinson argues that language, “rather than acting as 
a marker of human superiority, becomes the means by which we recognize the 
essential otherness of different species” (29). But without restoring convictions of 
human superiority to the natural world, we may also cite as an ethical end of 
Ponge’s work the recognition that, though it impedes various human projects, the 
otherness of nature’s substance and nonhuman species need not lead to our unhappy 
renunciation of these projects altogether. The poetic subject inscribed at the end of 
the final poem of Le Parti pris des choses, “Le Galet” (‘The Seashore Stone’), is 
struck silent—“Je n’en dirai pas plus” (Parti 56) ‘I’ll say no more’—at the idea of 
2
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the traces washed away from the surface of the stone: “car cette idée d’une 
disparition de signes me donne à réfléchir sur les défauts d’un style qui appuie trop 
sur les mots” (56) ‘for this idea of a disappearance of signs makes me reflect on the 
shortcomings2 of a style that relies too much on words.’ Though surely a reflection 
on the text not being stone enough, this passage also expresses the human excess 
(words as de trop), symmetrical to the irreducible remainder of stone never captured 
by the text. It is the supplement of a human subject whose projects, though they do 
not wholly capture the material world, are not wholly effaced, not even by the self-
effacing humility at the end of the text. Writing recently on “Le Galet,” Julian 
Murphet cites the material horizon that limits all efforts to transcend it, and argues 
that in the poem “the only residue of God lies in the very powers of intellection and 
humility that can adduce such a horizon in the first place, without falling victim to 
melancholy, rage, or resignation” (1506). Indeed, for Ponge equilibrium of humility 
and pride restores us to our proper rank, which is not a matter of esteem but of 
human well-being. In his “Notes premières de ‘L’Homme’” (‘Preliminary Notes on 
“Man”’) Ponge insists that “Il faut replacer l’homme à son rang dans la nature: il 
est assez haut” ‘We have to restore man to his rank in nature: it is fairly high,’ and 
although the human being judges nature to be absurd, Ponge urges, “Qu’il ne s’en 
rende donc pas malade” ‘He should not make himself sick over it’ but find instead 
an equilibrium within nature. 
 
 Qu’il se félicite plutôt: Il dispose de moyens pour: 
 10 s’y tenir en équilibre: l’instinct (semblable à celui de ces magots à 
cul de plomb qui se redressent toujours), la science, la morale (c’est-à-dire 
de la santé physique et mentale); 
 20 l’exprimer, la réfléchir, se défaire de tout complexe d’infériorité à son 
égard: la littérature, les arts. (Proêmes 225) 
 
 Rather let him be happy: he has at his disposal the means to: 
 1. hold himself there in equilibrium: instinct (like one of those weighted 
figurines that always return upright), science, morality (that is, physical and 
mental health); 
 2. express it, reflect it, relieve himself of any inferiority complex about 
it: literature, the arts. 
 
 Keeping in mind that a component of Ponge’s poetic project is to sidestep 
a tragic interpretation of the absurd—“Bien entendu, la non-signification du 
monde! Mais qu’y a-t-il là de tragique?” (Proêmes 213) ‘Granted, the non-
signification of the world. But what’s tragic about that?’—this essay argues that 
 
2 Défaut comes from défaillir, to be absent. 
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Ponge’s poetics of the nonhuman supports an ethical project of human well-being, 
wherein we no longer have to take sides in the conflict between endless defeat and 
claims of mastery. By exploring tropes of insufficiency or excess, of lesser or 
greater than, of below or above, especially in texts in which the rhetoric of example 
appears to take nature’s substances and other species as models for human 
comportment, this essay aims to recuperate Ponge’s residual humanism, whereby 
the human being unfolds its own nature, of which it is the sole measure, neither 
greater nor lesser than the rest of nature. 
There are, of course, canonical examples of the human subject in search of 
its rank in nature. Pascal’s roseau pensant ‘thinking reed,’ for instance, surmounts 
a vanishingly small presence in the universe by understanding what exceeds it: “Par 
l’espace l’univers me comprend et m’engloutit comme un point, par la pensée je le 
comprends” (150) ‘In space, the universe encompasses me and swallows me up like 
a point, by thought I comprehend it.’ Unwilling to perform this conversion of 
insignificance into “la grandeur de l’homme” (Pascal 149) ‘the greatness of man,’ 
Ponge resolved in “Notes premières de ‘L’Homme’”: “il faut que je relise Pascal 
(pour le démolir)” (228) ‘I have to reread Pascal (to demolish him).’ On the other 
hand, revealing a similar inclination to situate human beings in the cosmos, Ponge’s 
poem “Le Pain” (‘Bread’) figures the vast and small dimensions that we inhabit, 
and Ponge’s disinclination to resolve the dialectical conflict between them, in its 
figurative logic. Because of a resemblance to mountainous landscapes— “à cause 
de cette impression quasi panoramique qu’elle donne”3 ‘Because of this quasi-
panoramic impression that it provides’—the surface of the bread is “merveilleuse 
d’abord” ‘a marvel to behold at first,’ “comme si l’on avait à sa disposition sous la 
main les Alpes, le Taurus ou la Cordillère des Andes” (Parti 22) ‘as if one had at 
one’s disposal the Alps, the Taurus, the Cordillera of the Andes.’ Although this 
comparison reveals our tendency to revere nature’s sublime spectacles, which come 
so readily to mind that they ennoble the ordinary objects of our domestic life, it also 
suggests the opposite, that we tend to domesticate nature, and in this way it betrays 
the mistaken impression (for it is only “as if”) of the human observer that all of 
nature is “à sa disposition,” an ambivalence that organizes the figures of the poem’s 
opening two sentences. Whereas bread, an object of daily consumption, is the tenor 
in the first sentence (cited above) and the landscape is the vehicle, the poem 
reverses the comparison in the second sentence, where “Ainsi donc une masse 
amorphe en train d’éructer fut glissée pour nous dans le four stellaire” (Parti 22, 
 
3 It has often been suggested that panoramique ‘panoramic’ is a pun based on a phonic similarity 
to “pain” ‘bread’ with bread replacing the Greek “pan” ‘everything.’ This linguistic account of the 
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my emphasis) ‘Thus it was that an amorphous, belching mass was slid into the 
heavenly oven for us’ makes the domestic environment the vehicle and the cosmos 
the tenor, completing a symmetry that recalls Pascal’s double infinity. Unsure 
where we stand between the literal and figurative poles, between the domestic and 
the cosmic spaces, we human beings summon, not a thinking reed’s dialectical 
solution, but instead “ce pouvoir vivre entre deux infinis” (Proêmes 229, emphasis 
in the original) ‘this ability to live between two infinities.’ Ponge’s conviction that 
“Il faut réintégrer l’idée de Dieu à l’idée de l’homme. Et simplement vivre” 
(Proêmes 228) ‘We have to reintegrate the idea of God into the idea of man. And 
simply live’ is expressed in the assimilation of bread (including its religious 
signification) to our vital functions rather than to our symbolic operations. “Mais 
brisons-la: car le pain doit être dans notre bouche moins objet de respect que de 
consommation”4 (Parti 23) ‘But let’s break bread: for bread in our mouths must be 
less an object of respect than of consumption’ is a response to the contradiction 
between our reverence for the natural contexts that humble our modern poetic urges 
and an exalting conviction (“thus it was”) that the planet was made for us, one that 
has a long history with powerful precedents, such as the Encyclopédie 
(‘Encyclopedia’) of Diderot and d’Alembert. 
 
Si l'on bannit l'homme ou l'être pensant & contemplateur de dessus la 
surface de la terre ; ce spectacle pathétique & sublime de la nature n'est plus 
qu'une scene triste & muette. L'univers se taît ; le silence & la nuit s'en 
emparent. (Encyclopédie 5:641) 
 
If we banish man or the thinking and contemplating being from the face of 
the earth, this moving and sublime spectacle of nature is nothing but a sad 
and dead scene. The universe goes quiet: silence and night take hold. 
 
The situation is the reverse for Ponge. The thinking and contemplating 
human being seeks admittance to the natural environment from the things that 
remain silent. Acknowledging “les choses [qui] se taisent” ‘the things that stay 
quiet,’ Ponge invites us “en leur honneur à faire observer une minute de silence. . . . 
Pour savoir d’elles si elles nous admettent, si elles nous tolèrent sans trop de 
rancœur ni de dégoût” (Méthodes 658) ‘in their honor to observe a moment of 
silence. . . . To know if they admit us, if they tolerate us without too much rancor 
or disgust.’ Language can block us from taking our place in nature, and in opposite 
ways. Either language risks running roughshod over its material object, or material 
nature leaves us tongue-tied, as in Le Pré (‘The Meadow’) where, disposed as he is 
 
4 The homophonic “brisons-là” (note the accent) is an idiomatic expression for “enough talk.” 
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toward “[le] pré que je veux dire” (340) ‘the meadow I want to say,’ the narrator 
quickly finds his progress on the page, and across the meadow, to be blocked: 
 
Mais qu’est-ce qui obstrue ainsi notre chemin? 
. . . . 
Pourquoi, dès notre issue en surplomb sur la page, 
Dans ce seul paragraphe, tous ces scrupules? (341) 
 
But what is this now in our way? 
. . . . 
Why, as soon as we set out over the page, 
In this one paragraph alone, all these scruples? 
 
These scrupules—from the Latin scrupulum, meaning pebble, such as the sort we 
might feel painfully in our shoe—impede our twin projects of traversing and talking 
about nature.5 Ponge imagines us welcomed by the nonhuman, but for our sake as 
much as anything, and this is unmistakably an ethical aim: 
 
Si j’ai choisi de parler de la coccinelle c’est par dégoût des idées. Mais 
ce dégoût des idées? C’est qu’elles ne me viennent pas à bonheur, mais à 
malheur. (Proêmes 213) 
 
If I have chosen to speak of the ladybug, it is out of disgust for ideas. 
But this disgust for ideas? It’s because I have them not happily, but 
unhappily. 
 
Happiness, the overall end achieved by autotelic human action in eudaimonist 
thinking, is the overall end of poetry for Ponge: “L’on devrait pouvoir à tous 
poèmes donner ce titre : Raisons de vivre heureux” (Proêmes 197) ‘We should be 
able to give all poems this title: Reasons to live happy.’6 Poems bear within them a 
 
5 For this insight, and for much else, I am indebted to Steven Winspur. See La Poésie du lieu (‘Poetry 
of Place’). “A ces moments-là le corps nous fait défaut, notre pied résiste tout en nous rappelant que 
nous sommes bel et bien un animal de chair qui se déplace sur la terre, un corps parmi d’autres plutôt 
qu’une conscience abritée du hasard et capable de tout” (81) ‘At these moments, the body fails us, 
our foot resists while at the same time reminding us that we are indeed an animal of flesh that moves 
across the land, a body among others rather than a consciousness sheltered from chance and capable 
of anything.’ 
6 See Winspur, “La Poéthique de Ponge” (‘Ponge’s Poethics’). “L’activité de ‘vivre heureux’ devrait 
donc trouver sa justification profonde dans chaque poème (et non seulement dans ceux qu’un poète 
aurait écrits à cet effet), ce qui souligne le rapport réciproque qui existe entre le déchiffrement des 
formules poétiques et la construction continue par les lecteurs (y compris l’écrivain) d’une forme 
de vie qui est particulière à chacun d’eux” (243) ‘the activity of “living happily” should therefore 
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logic of human actions oriented toward overcoming the various kinds of 
unhappiness resulting from our own endeavors, and it comes from a certain 
orientation of our bodies and our intellectual faculties toward each other, and 
toward the material world around us, the reconciliation arising at the moment when, 
as Ponge puts it, human beings “[perdent] à peu près la parole” (Méthodes 631) 
‘just about lose speech.’ Not losing speech altogether but only nearly, or more or 
less, we may, with the example of poetic language, quiet the claims of dominion 
and the concessions of defeat, and instead feel at home in ‘le monde muet . . . notre 
seule patrie” (631) ‘the mute world . . . our only homeland.’ 
 The geological story narrated in Ponge’s poem “Le Galet,” is the formation 
and ongoing disaggregation of an ancient or antediluvian unity. This story 
implicitly raises a question of whether, in a larger narrative of natural history, 
human beings have emerged on the landscape as a species presiding over nature 
through their ideational projects of individuating and defining nature’s elements 
and inhabitants, and reflecting on their place in nature. From the start of the poem, 
the outlook is not good, and various forms of hedging ensue. “Le Galet” is a story 
of compromises, deficiencies, and failures of a human epistemological project 
oriented toward talking about stone in universal claims with ultimate legislative 
authority. Since, as the first sentence concedes, “Le galet n’est pas une chose facile 
à bien définir” (Parti 49) ‘The stone is not an easy thing to define well,’ one might 
consider settling for a description—“Si l’on se contente d’une simple description” 
(49) ‘If we settle for a simple description’—though that, too, leads to problems, 
specifically the questionable legitimation of a discourse that relates words, objects, 
and ideas: “Mais ce propos déjà indique de la pierre une notion qui doit être 
justifiée” (50, my emphasis) ‘But this remark already indicates a notion of stone 
that needs justification.’ And all this wanting for notions makes one susceptible to 
mistaking figures for nature: “A l’esprit en mal de notions qui s’est d’abord nourri 
de telles apparences, à propos de la pierre la nature apparaîtra enfin, sous un jour 
peut-être trop simple, comme une montre dont le principe est fait de roues qui 
tournent à de très inégales vitesses” (53) ‘To the mind wanting for notions, having 
first fed on such appearances, when it comes to stone, nature will ultimately appear, 
in perhaps too simple a light, as a watch whose principle is made of gears that turn 
at very unequal speeds.’ This well-worn metaphor of the clockwork cosmos in 
natural philosophy is a parodic form of Derrida’s usure ‘wear/ usury,’ the unlimited 
currency of metaphor passing for philosophy’s universal concepts, metaphor “qui 
cache et se cache” (251) ‘that hides and hides itself.’ For what could be more 
apparent than the transparent historicity of this mere but unmistakable appearance? 
 
find its deep justification in each poem (and not just in those a poet might have written to this end), 
which underlines the reciprocal relationship that exists between the deciphering of poetic formulas 
and the ongoing construction by readers (authors included) of a form of life particular to each of 
them.’ 
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And so like the painful pebble of Le Pré, resisting figuration, the sensible 
materiality of stone asserts itself to the body, not the esprit ‘mind’, for when a grain 
of sand blown by the wind manages to get “réellement dans nos yeux, c’est ainsi 
que la pierre punit et termine notre contemplation” (Parti 52) ‘really in our eyes, 
this is how stone punishes and ends our contemplation.’ At first figuratively in our 
eyes, and then physically—or really—so, “l’objet qui nous occupe” (52) ‘the object 
that occupies us’ exchanges one occupation for another, defeating us in the moment 
of our contemplative gaze on the landscape and punishing us the only way it can, 
with its materiality, and in collaboration with our own. Discomfort, distortions, 
banality, and settling for less, each a different area of human unhappiness, are the 
results so far. In the end, however, although the narrator appears as the loser in the 
epistemological story, when he imagines his future critics looking back and saying, 
“Ayant entrepris d’écrire une description de la pierre, il s’empêtra” (56) ‘Having 
set out to write a description of the stone, he got entangled,’ he nevertheless 
achieves a felicitous end, when Derrida’s etymon, the imprint of a lost primitive 
meaning, makes a poetic appearance in the false etymology of the overdetermined 
result written in stone, so to speak: “il s’empêtra.”7 “Trop heureux seulement 
d’avoir pour ces débuts su choisir le galet” (56) ‘All too happy merely to have 
chosen the stone for this first try,’ he cannot help but smile—as if in trying to 
describe stone, one can only meet a petrifying end—snatching a poetic victory from 
the jaws of defeat. 
If such poetic consolations are possible, having nature “à notre disposition” 
in poetic texts may be a more ambivalent posture than it seemed at first, reflecting 
our conflicting commitments about nature: that on the one hand it is subordinated 
to us and at our disposal, and that on the other hand our own (human) nature is 
disposed toward nature writ large in ways we have yet to realize, as the opening to 
Le Pré suggests.  
 
Que parfois la Nature, à notre réveil, nous propose 
Ce à quoi justement nous étions disposés. (Le Pré 340) 
 
Let Nature sometimes, as we awake, propose to us 
Precisely that to which we were disposed. 
 
The goal is to unfold this natural disposition of ours in such a way that we no longer 
remain “dès l’abord . . . interdits” (341) ‘from the start . . . forbidden/speechless,’ 
achieving a linguistic felicity, not by expressing our dominion over nature in 
definitions, laws, or the lost, utopian unity of word and thing, but rather by figuring 
 
7 S’empêtra is an inflected form of the verb s’empêtrer, which is etymologically unrelated to the 
Latin “petra” ‘stone.’ 
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nothing more—or less—than its resistance. “Le Galet” ends this way, with the “Je 
n’en dirai pas plus” that leads to the narrator not exactly uttering a bon mot, leaving 
the folly of having the last word to his critics, but having instead the last laugh, with 
the immobilizing entanglement that accomplishes the comic reversal of the tragic 
romance of defeated reason.8 Adjusting its ends at first from definition to 
description to legitimation, the poem eventually figures stone as the material that 
defies all ends, being the only thing in nature “qui y meure constamment” (Parti 
53) ‘that constantly dies there,’ and in doing so, the poem shows “l’art de résister 
aux paroles” (Proêmes 193) ‘the art of resisting words’ by its own resistance 
(“contrairement à l’opinion commune” [Parti 53] ‘contrary to what is commonly 
thought’) to the petrifications of doxa, to the too-permanent, worn-out metaphor of 
rock as permanence. “Le Galet” ultimately changes altogether the ends that we 
pursue with language, its subversion of the lure a non-rhetorical discourse having 
no end other than itself. All too happy at the end to have chosen the difficult stone 
from the start; “Le Galet” is an example of an autotelic act.  
 These changes in linguistic aims provide a template for reorganizing other 
ends that we pursue. For instance, consider the competing modes of happiness, or 
pleasure, in the poem “Les Plaisirs de la porte” (‘The Pleasures of the Door’). The 
first mode depends on recognition of a universal claim, not merely a statement but 
an injunction, uttered in the name of political authority—“Les rois ne touchent pas 
aux portes” (Parti 21) ‘Kings don’t touch doors’—and is that which is done “au 
plaisir du roi” ‘at the pleasure of the king.’ The second mode belongs to the valet, 
or the rest of us: “[Les rois] ne connaissent pas ce bonheur d’empoigner au ventre 
par son nœud de porcelaine l’un de ces hauts obstacles d’une pièce, ce corps à corps 
rapide” (21) ‘[Kings] do not know this happiness of grabbing one of these great 
obstacles of a room right in the belly by its porcelain knob, this quick body-to-
body.’ This is the happiness of an action done for its own sake. The door 
participates in both. In the first case, it is the object that structures the order of the 
court through the ritual of valets, not kings, opening doors, and that along with the 
subject, produces or legitimates the king. In the second case, the happiness is 
produced by the mutual embrace of the subject’s material qualities and those of the 
object, all of which are the opposite of “the immaterial excess that differentiates a 
royal body from its brute physicality,” as Bill Brown puts it in “The Tyranny of 
Things” (458), a body that is missing from the text and that precisely does not act. 
But by restoring to our imagination a political order that we only recognize as 
révolu ‘long gone,’ this text is the opposite of revolution and the establishment of 
a radical material equality. “Les rois ne touchent pas aux portes” sits atop the text, 
forbidding democracy, “le copieusement habité lieu commun” (Parti 30) 
 
8 Julian Murphet identifies in this poem “the comic resuscitations and regenerations of the 
contemptible organic cycles” (1505). 
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‘copiously inhabited commonplace’ in “Bords de mer” (‘Seashores’), the realm of 
cliché that Ponge famously views with suspicion.9 Any equality here is 
asymmetrical (the door acquiring a body, and a belly10) and short-lived, resolved 
back into the reign of the subject: “D’une main amicale [le corps] la retient encore 
avant de la repousser décidément et s’enclore” (21, my emphasis) ‘With a friendly 
hand [the body] holds it open a moment before pushing it away brusquely and 
shutting itself back inside.’ “On ne peut aucunement sortir de l’homme” (Proêmes 
198) ‘we cannot step outside of man,’ which is to say into an apolitical realm of 
pure materiality, since the fleeting pleasure transforms the materiality of ‘one of 
these great obstacles’ into a passage, and back again into clôture ‘enclosure.’ 
Though it reveals the contingency of authority, reminding us that “the difference 
between democracy and monarchy is an illusion” (467), as Bill Brown argues, the 
text does not liberate the object once and for all from human projects. Instead, the 
object is reenlisted in actions done for their own sake by a subject that is ethical, 
not political, in nature, a pursuit of happiness neglected by those whose actions are 
not self-legitimating. 
 The king is dead, or illusory, long live the king! As an example to us all of 
unhappiness. The authority of his example is enduring and universal, valid in all 
contexts, even those, like this text and our daily lives, without royal bodies. 
Bertrand Russell worried whether “The king of France is bald” is true or false given 
that France is a Republic (Russell concluded it was false). To consider the truth 
conditions of “kings don’t touch doors” is to overlook its force. Neither true nor 
false, it has as a perlocutionary effect to make us see (or say) what we already know, 
not that kings do not touch doors (for who can say?), but that we often do. When 
Ponge famously remarked, “Je désire moins aboutir à un poème qu’à une formule” 
‘My goal is less a poem than a formula,’ he understood the formule as “capable 
d’effets pratiques” (Pratiques 1029) ‘capable of pragmatic effects.’ Taking his 
examples from Jean de La Fontaine’s “Le Lion et le rat” (‘The Lion and the Rat’)—
“Patience et longueur de temps / Font mieux que force ni que rage” (Rage 425-26) 
‘Patience and passage of time / Accomplish more than force or rage’—he saw in 
them not the authority of La Fontaine—“où est en cela La Fontaine?” ‘Where is La 
Fontaine in any of this?’ —but the truth of an action, “la vérité d’un acte de lion” 
(426) ‘the truth of a lion act.’ Philippe Met has argued that the pragmatic potential 
of Ponge’s formule depends on one aspect of its abstraction, the fact that it is 
“détachable de son initiateur et de son contexte” (67) ‘detachable from its originator 
and its context.’ Having no connection to a legitimating origin, the formule is a self-
 
9 See Philippe Met, Formules de la poésie (‘Formulas of Poetry’) for a superb discussion of the 
spatial logic of language as a liberating enclosure in Ponge. (20-25). 
10 Austin Hancock identifies in this poem a “non-anthropocentric anthropomorphism” that figures 
the sensation of “having the door touch us back” (393). 
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authorizing utterance, exemplified in the organization of “Le Lion et le rat,” which 
begins as follows. 
 
Il faut, autant qu’on peut, obliger tout le monde: 
On a souvent besoin d’un plus petit que soi. 
De cette vérité deux Fables feront foi, 
 Tant la chose en preuves abonde. 
 Entre les pattes d’un Lion 
Un Rat sortit de terre assez à l'étourdie. 
Le Roi des animaux, en cette occasion, 
Montra ce qu'il était, et lui donna la vie. (77) 
 
One must, as much as possible, be kind to all: 
We often need someone lesser than we. 
Of this truth two fables will persuade, 
 So abounding in proof is it. 
 Between a Lion’s paws 
A Rat emerged thoughtlessly. 
The King of animals, on this occasion, 
Showed what he was, and spared him. 
 
The demonstration by example follows the moral, but the exemplary act is outside 
any chain of causation or demonstration, appearing even to precede its cause.11 The 
lion shows kindness to the rat spontaneously (that is, before he is ensnared and at 
the mercy of the rat, who frees him by gnawing the net, all of which comes next in 
the fable), making this not a fable of a lesson learned, but of not needing to learn 
the lesson of humility expressed in the moral. Such morals, for Ponge, are not rules 
to follow but pragmatic utterances that can “montrer aux gens ce qu’il pensent, les 
mettre d’accord avec eux-mêmes” (Pratiques 1029) ‘show people what they think, 
put them in agreement with themselves.’ Needing no example, the lion ‘showed 
what he was.’ 
 How might such an exemplary creature instruct us? To see the problem 
more clearly in Ponge’s work, we may look to the pascalian shakeup that opens 
 
11 In Crises of the Sentence Jan Mieszkowski has recently explained, “propositions articulated in 
anticipation of demonstrations required to validate or refute them irremediably betray their own 
incompleteness” (50). La Fontaine’s fable “Le Loup et l’agneau” (‘The Wolf and the Lamb’) begins 
“La raison du plus fort est toujours la meilleure:/ Nous l’allons montrer tout à l’heure” (Fables 53) 
‘The reason of the strongest is always the best. We will now show this is so.’ Reading this text as a 
fable of the tyranny of western reason, Michel Serres comments, “La raison du plus fort, c’est la 
raison tout court” (Hermès 104) ‘The reason of the strongest is reason itself.’ By Serres’s reading, 
the moral of the fable is that its moral needs no demonstration but is instead true from the start, “sans 
autre forme de procès” (Fables 53) ‘with no other form of trial.’ 
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“Notes pour un coquillage” (‘Notes for a Shell’) and its apparent lesson about 
grandeur. 
 
 Un coquillage est une petite chose, mais je peux la démesurer en la 
replaçant où je la trouve, posée sur l’étendue du sable. Car alors je prendrai 
une poignée de sable et j’observerai le peu qui me reste dans la main après 
que par les interstices de mes doigts presque toute la poignée aura filé, 
j’observerai quelques grains, puis chaque grain, et aucun de ces grains de 
sable à ce moment ne m’apparaîtra plus une petite chose, et bientôt le 
coquillage formel, cette coquille d’huître ou cette tiare bâtarde, ou ce 
“couteau,” m’impressionnera comme un énorme monument, en même 
temps colossal et précieux, quelque chose comme le temple d’Angkor, 
Saint-Maclou, ou les Pyramides. (Parti 38) 
 
A shell is a small thing, but I can enlarge it beyond measure by putting it 
back where I found it, resting on the expanse of sand. For I will then take a 
handful of sand and observe the little that remains in my hand after almost 
all of it will have run between my fingers, I will observe a few grains, then 
each grain, and none of these grains of sand will at that moment appear to 
me a small thing, and soon this formal shell, this oyster shell or this volute, 
or this “razor” shell, will impress me as an enormous monument, at once 
colossal and precious, something like the temple of Angkor, Saint-Maclou, 
or the Pyramids. 
 
Though the change in perspective aggrandizes the relative size of the mollusk in its 
environment, the text nevertheless expresses the démesure ‘disproportion’ of the 
human perspective. Hubristic enough to see lessons in nature, we learn from them 
how to be humble. This contradiction cannot be overcome. It is a contradiction at 
the core of our actions. For whereas the poem proposes the law of the mollusk for 
our moral edification, the mollusk, on the contrary, needs no law other than its own. 
No wonder that this poem, as examples of “la disproportion grotesque” (40) ‘the 
grotesque disproportion’ of our imagination and our bodies, names a temple, a 
church, and the Pyramids. Whether we turn for our laws to the examples of the 
natural world around us or to the divinities we created and then mistook for our 
creators, the result is the same for Ponge, a form of alienation. We have not yet 
found our own law and become, “Cet homme sobre et simple, qui veut vivre selon 
sa loi, son équilibre heureux” (Proêmes 230) ‘This sober and simple man, who 
wants to live according to his law, his happy equilibrium.’ 
“Escargots” (‘Snails’) gestures at the resolution of this alienation of our 
ethical and imaginative labor, the snail being an example of an organism whose 
actions, or expressions, are indistinguishable from its form. 
12




Leur sécrétion même se produit de telle manière qu’elle se met en forme. 
Rien d’extérieur à eux, à leur nécessité, à leur besoin n’est leur œuvre. Rien 
de disproportionné—d’autre part—à leur être physique. (Parti 27) 
 
Their very secretion is produced so as to take form. Their work has nothing 
exterior to them, to their necessity, to their needs. Nothing 
disproportionate—moreover—to their physical being. 
 
The rhetoric of example is explicit and repeated near the end of the poem: “Ainsi 
en est-il de tous ceux qui s’expriment d’une façon entièrement subjective sans 
repentir” (27, my emphasis) ‘Thus it is with all those who express themselves in an 
entirely subjective manner without remorse.’ Or a few lines later: “Mais c’est ici 
que je touche à l’un des points principaux de leur leçon” (27, my emphasis) ‘But 
here I touch on one of the principal points of their lesson.’ Or yet again, “Et voilà 
l’exemple qu’ils nous donnent” (27, my emphasis) ‘And this is the example they 
provide.’ At each of these moments, the reader confronts an exhortation to pattern 
his or her own behavior on the snail’s peculiar feature, but in the end, this feature 
blocks the reading of the snail as an example altogether, for the exemplarity of the 
snail, its saintliness, is its obedience to nothing but its own nature: “Mais saints en 
quoi: en obéissant précisément à leur nature. Connais-toi donc d’abord toi-même” 
(27) ‘But saints how: in obeying exactly their nature. First off, therefore, know 
yourself.’ This complicates things for reading because the explicit moral interferes 
with the logic of representation, and vice versa. The poem enjoins us to know 
ourselves and to express ourselves in a manner suited to our nature, but finding our 
way to this lesson requires that we answer to a name that is not our own, that of the 
snail.12 And if we cannot learn to obey the Delphic maxim “Know thyself” by 
imitating models, since that would be to commit the error that the poem condemns, 
this is ultimately because we must in this process develop the ethical independence 
of an organism that knows its nature and how to deploy it. Doing what we are told 
requires no such understanding, nor does it allow that self-knowledge is not 
achieved and expressed once and for all, as if it were “une demeure solide . . . plus 
durable qu’eux-mêmes” (27) ‘a solid dwelling . . . more enduring than them,’ but 
is instead the ongoing activity of acting in character, harmonizing our commitment 
 
12In Fables of Responsibility Thomas Keenan identifies this as central to how fables function, taking 
as an example the fable of the eagle and the raven in Caxton’s fables of Aesop. “The apostrophe of 
reading (which is the signature of the fable as a genre, the moral as address to the reader) is just as 
aberrant as the simile of the fable. You are not a raven, not even like a raven, and don’t think you 
are. But to learn not to make this figural error, you must compare yourself to the raven, with its 
disfigured self-knowledge. […] The fable is structured as a double-bind: to heed its call you must 
ignore its call, you must make the mistake the fable denounces” (66). 
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to self-knowledge with the means of pursuing and expressing it, allowing us to be 
“des êtres dont l’existence même est œuvre d’art” (27) ‘beings whose very 
existence is a work of art.’ 
 To explore how a text’s examples might lead to our obeying our own nature, 
we may look to two tropes from Le Parti pris des choses that illustrate how nature’s 
elements coincide with themselves despite our efforts to make them into metaphors 
of human behavior. One of these is water in the poem “De l’eau” (‘On Water’13), 
and the other is again the stone from “Le Galet.” From the beginning “De l’eau” 
places the human above water: “Plus bas que moi, toujours plus bas que moi se 
trouve l’eau. C’est toujours les yeux baissés que je la regarde” (31) ‘Beneath me, 
water is always beneath me. I always look at it with lowered eyes.’ Water, always 
beneath the narrator, seems to occupy a lower ethical rank because of “cet 
hystérique besoin de n’obéir qu’à sa pesanteur, qui la possède comme une idée fixe” 
(31) ‘this hysterical need to obey only gravity, which possesses it like une idée fixe.’ 
But this poem also bears the latent signs of respect for water, “les yeux baissés” (31) 
‘lowered eyes,’ as would express the humility of a valet before the king. In the 
ambivalent hierarchy of this texte à deux sens14 ‘two-way/two-meaning text’ we 
see water as an opportunity to educe an ethical law, but at the same time, we see in 
its obedience only to the laws of its physical properties an inalienable behavior that 
is like an idée fixe but is no idea at all, ideas being our domain and precisely where 
our own attempts at formulating ethical principles run amok, especially when we 
make of water an idea about our own behavior.15 When the narrator remarks, 
“Toujours plus bas: telle semble être sa devise: le contraire d’excelsior” (31) ‘Ever 
lower: so seems to be its motto: the opposite of excelsior,’ the issue here is not that 
water aspires to be ever lower and is therefore an ignominious model of perpetual 
self-debasement, but instead that water does not aspire at all, much less to the 
pursuit of moral perfection called for in “Escargots” (27). The “ever higher” of 
excelsior, on the other hand, is a fitting motto for human beings, who can aspire to 
 
13 The partitive article makes “Some Water” a possible translation. 
14 In Poétique de Francis Ponge (‘Poetics of Francis Ponge’) Bernard Beugnot characterizes 
allegory in Ponge as a case of there being “deux sens, sans que l’un nécessairement abolisse l’autre, 
même si le plus souvent de l’un à l’autre une hiérarchie tend à s’établir” (9) ‘two meanings, without 
one necessarily abolishing the other, even if most often a hierarchy tends to establish itself between 
them.’ 
15 On the relationship between proverbs, lieux communs, and Ponge’s ‘disgust for ideas’ (Proêmes 
193) see Philippe Met. “La formule verbale pongienne fournit l’un des meilleurs garde-fous, l’un 
des plus sûrs moyens de résistance ou de défense contre la tyrannie des idées et des pensées” (77) 
‘the Pongian verbal formula provides one of the best guardrails, one of the best means of resistance 
or defense against the tyranny of ideas and thoughts.’ See also Michel Collot (140-44), who notes 
that objects (or animals) modeling human behavior enact a movement “de l’objectif au subjectif, du 
physique au moral” ‘from the objective to the subjective, from the physical to the moral’ that 
threatens the commitment to the object itself, but that it is accompanied by a scientific terminology 
that is an extension of non-exact knowledge, which resists the categories of abstraction. 
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more laudable behavior precisely because they are the origin and cause of their own 
actions. 
 Human aspiration requires acting for certain reasons, or as the philosopher 
Julia Annas explains regarding virtue, “virtue is not just a habit of copying what 
others do but a disposition to act which involves understanding what you do, self-
directedness, and a drive to improve” (27). The distinction between a body subject 
to the laws governing nature and one capable of ethical action is an Aristotelian 
one, between the involuntary and the voluntary, and bodies that do not have the 
principle of action within them do not aspire to excellence, to the “living and faring 
well” defined in the Nicomachean Ethics as happiness, the self-justifying end of 
human action, performed “in accordance with the appropriate excellence” (14-15). 
Of the involuntary Aristotle explains, “that is compulsory of which the moving 
principle is outside, being a principle in which nothing is contributed by the person 
who acts—or, rather, is acted upon, e.g. if he were to be carried somewhere by a 
wind” (48). Whereas the grain of sand in “Le Galet” is carried by the wind, the 
human visitor to the landscape is not solely compelled by the physical laws 
governing material nature but is “a moving principle or begetter of his actions” 
(59).16 Gravity is among those laws to which we are subject, of course (“Certes, 
tout au monde connaît ce besoin” [Parti 31] ‘To be sure, everything in the world 
knows this need’), but it does not operate in that area of our behavior where laws 
are not determined for us, or those laws that we are free to obey or not and that 
solicit our practical reason.17 
 Often translated as disposition or state of character, hexis is for Aristotle 
both cause and effect of our actions, something within us that disposes us toward 
certain kinds of actions and that is also formed by those actions in the course of our 
ethical development, which cannot be a matter of copying others (or copying 
examples) because it is the expression of our aspiration to self-directedness. 
Though water is disposed invariably to follow the effects of gravity and 
evaporation—the competing influence of the earth, and a moon and sun that are 
“jaloux” (Parti 32) ‘jealous’—this scientific notion of disposition excludes the 
rational principle of aspiration to faring well, which requires that we move past 
doing what we are told, and that we learn to act more and more in accordance with 
our character. Ponge’s poetics of the nonhuman, though respectful of the silence of 
nature, names reason as the representative of nature in human beings, and clamors 
 
16 See Sarah Broadie, Ethics With Aristotle: “We are natural substances whose essential nature is to 
act, feel and think as voluntary agents. Such is the view of human reality that emerges in Aristotle’s 
Ethics” (130).  
17 See Lionel Cuillé’s commentary on Darwinism and Ponge. “Ce que Ponge privilégie c’est la 
volonté (politique) de l’homme qui lui permettra de s’affranchir de l’ordre naturel pour établir un 
ordre social plus juste” (240) ‘Ponge privileges the (political) will of man that will allow him to free 
himself from the natural order so as to establish a more just social order.’ 
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for it to speak up and be heard by us, at once self-expression and self-knowledge, 
as we see in “Des Raisons d’écrire” (‘Reasons to Write’). 
 
nous avons observé que la Nature autrement puissante que les hommes fait 
dix fois moins de bruit, et que la nature dans l’homme, je veux dire la raison, 
n’en fait pas du tout. 
 Eh bien! Ne serait-ce qu’à nous-mêmes nous voulons faire entendre la 
voix d’un homme. (Proêmes 195-96). 
 
we have noticed that Nature, powerful in a different way from how men are, 
makes ten times less noise, and that nature in man, by which I mean reason, 
makes none at all. 
 
Well then! If only to ourselves we want to make the voice of a man heard. 
 
 Formulating gravity as the law of inverse squares or as a fable of virtue and 
vice, we miss opportunities to make the voice of practical reason heard, through the 
hypocritical and ethically empty claim to mastery of the laws to which we are 
ourselves subjected, on the one hand, or through our attachment to imitation of 
ethical examples, on the other. In the first case, we overlook ethical responsibility. 
In the second case, we misplace it. “De l’eau,” in figuring two kinds of law 
(physical behavior of substances and ethical conduct, physis and nomos) at the same 
time and incompatibly, reminds us that our form of life does not appear in the 
examples of the text, nor is its field of action exhausted by the forces that move us 
and other bodies. The form of life particular to us takes shape instead as our 
dispositions toward the contradictions of texts (written and read), which arise from 
our contradictory disposition toward the natural world, to which we are disposed 
but which we presume to be at our disposal for our practical and moral ends. These 
dispositions—toward a text’s meanings, and toward natural contexts—are 
regulated and revealed by the same gestures and habits that develop “la notion 
propre de l’homme: la parole et la morale. L’humanisme” (Parti 27), ‘the proper 
notion of man: speech and morality. Humanism,’ which is to say, those that reveal 
our human nature to others and to ourselves. To read the poem “De l’eau” requires 
not that we choose between figures of the laudable and the contemptible, but that 
we see the asymmetry between virtue and vice, and the insolubility of the literal 
and figurative in the poem. “Toujours plus bas: telle semble être sa devise: le 
contraire d’excelsior” (Parti 31) ‘Ever lower: so seems to be its motto: the opposite 
of excelsior’. Water seems to have a motto, but appearances, we know from “Le 
Galet,” are deceiving. Twice called a besoin ‘need’ and three times called a vice, in 
neither case does the behavior of water express an aspiration to be lower, no more 
than a person’s vicious response to lust or lack reflects a commitment to baseness. 
16
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The human excelsior, on the other hand, expresses the human aspiration to act better 
and to live better. And this is not an aspiration to be above something else, or to be 
greater than something else, but to be greater than one was at a previous stage of 
one’s ethical formation, to be, or show, more and more what one is. 
 As we have seen, at the end of “Le Galet” the narrator measures linguistic 
expression with respect to nature, reflecting on the too-little accomplished by a text 
that is too much what it is. However, as the text follows the diminishing size of the 
stone, which day by day is smaller and smaller, we notice it is only ever measured 
against—so only ever smaller than—itself: “Enfin, de jour en jour plus petit mais 
toujours sûr de sa forme, aveugle, solide et sec dans sa profondeur, son caractère 
est de ne pas se laisser confondre mais plutôt réduire par les eaux” (56, my 
emphasis) ‘In the end, day after day smaller but always sure of its form, blind, solid, 
and dry deep down, its character is to not be absorbed but only reduced by water.’ 
The ethical model of unfolding one’s character is figured here as always being one’s 
own “plus petit que soi,” becoming ‘smaller than one is,’ which paradoxically 
makes one “plus grand” ‘greater.’ 
 
Il en sort plus petit, mais entier, et, si l’on veut, plus grand, puisque ses 
proportions ne dépendent aucunement de son volume. (56, emphasis in the 
original) 
 
It comes out smaller, but whole, and, if you like, greater, because its 
proportions do not at all depend on its volume. 
 
 The irony of the stone is that the more eroded it is, the more it shows its 
resistance, and the more it reveals itself as whole through changes that solidify and 
affirm its eidos ‘form’, since this process of change and identity is the material 
behavior that is the stone, the irreducible and unfigurable remainder that neither 
water nor any poetic endeavor will ever absorb away. It would seem that we have 
run afoul of contradictions in the rhetoric of example we have noted in Ponge, 
taking the stone as a metaphor of human self-knowledge (becoming more and more 
sure) and the enactment of hexis, ‘one’s own state of character,’ both changing and 
not, becoming what one is. Asked by Bernard Groethuysen in a letter whether or 
not the poem “Le Galet” was less about the stone itself than the stone as a metaphor 
of the human practice of language, Ponge responded, “Je ne voudrais pas que vous 
pensiez, et je ne le crois d’ailleurs pas possible, que le Galet tout entier ne soit 
qu’une seule ‘métaphore continuée’” (OC I 68) ‘I wouldn’t want you to think, and 
moreover I don’t think it’s possible, that le Galet is wholly an extended metaphor.’ 
Without yielding to Ponge’s authorial opinion here, we can nevertheless see that 
our reading confirms it. Entirely unlike the stone, which remains whole, “Le Galet” 
is nothing ‘wholly.’ The text is the contradiction of the words qui font défaut ‘that 
17
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aren’t enough,’ and that are also de trop ‘too much,’ doubly disclaiming the 
language that would, as Derrida puts it, “donner à connaître la chose même” (295) 
‘give the object itself to be known.’ More of a double self-effacement, it is precisely 
not what Derrida calls the double effacement (251) ‘double erasure’ by which 
metaphor appears as universal truth, the absolute and unlimited currency of the 
concept, when we no longer see the metaphor and take it for a proper meaning. The 
story of the stone’s usure, “Le Galet” sustains both the resistance of stone and the 
metaphor of its resistance, all at once and insolubly. This equilibrium, between 
mistaking our traces for nature itself and abject self-effacement, is Ponge’s 
humanism: speech and morality, “la notion propre de l’homme” (Parti 27) ‘the 
proper notion of man,’ not a proper (i.e. universal) concept but, like other -isms, an 
artistic practice, worthy of pride of ownership even, or especially, when we own up 
to its artifacts (propre ‘one’s own’). Pride in our contradictory character is the key 
to achieving “salut” ‘salvation,’ or well-being (via the Latin “salus” ‘welfare’). 
“Quand l’homme sera fier d’être non seulement le lieu où s’élaborent les idées et 
les sentiments, mais aussi bien le nœud où ils se détruisent et se confondent, il sera 
prêt alors d’être sauvé” (Méthodes 630) ‘When man is proud to be not only the site 
where ideas and sentiments are elaborated but also the nexus where they are 
destroyed and confounded, then he will be ready to be saved.’ Like the rock-bound 
task of Sisyphus, who in his relative successes Ponge imagines happy (Proêmes 
208), ‘the art of resisting words,’ practiced by the human and the nonhuman, is 
endless, though ours has as its ethical goal, or end, a human being that we can 
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